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GIFT TAXATION: INTEREST-FREE DEMAND LOANS
GIFT OR EQUIVALENT EXCHANGE?

-

Dickman v. Commissioner,
690 F.2d 812 (11th Cir. 1982)
Over several years, petitioners made substantial interest-free demand
loans' to their son and to their closely held corporation.? The Internal Revenue
Service determined these loans constituted a gift of the money's use value,
whether made on demand4 or for a definite term.5 Petitioners filed suit in Tax
Court seeking redetermination of the tax assessment. 6 The Tax Court concluded that the interest-free demand loans did not result in a taxable gift.7 On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and HELD, interestfree loans, whether on demand or for a fixed term, are subject to gift tax
consequences.8
In Commissioner v. Duberstein,9 the Supreme Court enunciated the proper
approach for analyzing whether a transfer constitutes a gift.1° The court noted
that a voluntary transfer of property without consideration is not necessarily a
gift for purposes of the income tax statute." Refusing to promulgate a specific
test, the Court stated whether a transfer is a gift is primarily a question of
fact.1 2 The Court indicated that the most critical consideration is the transfer3
or's intent.
1. 690 F.2d 812, 813 (11th Cir. 1982). The outstanding balance on the son's loans was
$144,715.87 in 1971 and rose to $342,815.87 by 1976. The corporation's outstanding balance
was $374,650 in 1971 and rose to $669,733 in 1972, but had been reduced to $207,875 by the
end of 1976. Id. at 813 n.
2. Id. at 813. The corporation, Artesian Farms, Inc., was owned primarily by the lenders'
son and the son's family. Id. The lenders owned the remaining stock of approximately
11.46%. Id. at 813 n.1.
3. Id. at 814. For an explanation of money's use value, see generally Joyce & Del Cotto,
The AB (ABC) and BA Transactions: An Economic and Tax Analysis of Reserve and Carved
Out Income Interest, 31 TAx L. R-v. 121 (1976) (the present value of money is worth less
than its future value). See also Joyce & Del Cotto, Interest-Free Loans: The Odyssey of a
Misnomer, 35 TAx L. R-v. 459, 489-90 (1980) (value of the use of money over time is the
interest rate).
4. 690 F.2d at 813. A loan made on a demand basis obligates the borrower to repay the
loan whenever the lender asks. The lender has the right to demand repayment at any time.
BLAcK's LAw DicTIoNARY 387 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
5. 690 F.2d at 813. A term loan is a loan which has a specific length of time before
maturity. BLAcK's LAw DlarroNARY 1318 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
6. 690 F.2d at 814.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 813.
9. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
10. Id. at 284-86.
11. Id. at 285. See I.R.C. § 22(b)(3) (1939) (current version at I.R.C. § 102(a) (West Supp.
1982)) (allows for exclusion of gifts from gross income).
12. 363 U.S. at 289.
13. Id. (citing Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 43 (1937)). The Court noted that a
gift "proceeds from a 'detached and disinterested generosity,' ... 'out of affection, respect,
admiration, charity or like impulses." Id. at 285.
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The first case to consider the gift tax provisions' effect on interest-free demand loans was Johnson v. United States.1 4 In Johnson, the court held interestfree demand loans do not give rise to a taxable event.1 5 The court noted that
the purpose of the gift tax statute is to prevent estate tax evasions.', Thus, inter
vivos transfers,' which reduce the transferor's taxable estate are subject to a
gift tax."' Otherwise, estate tax could be avoided simply by giving away the
entire estate. 19 Because interest-free demand loans remain estate assets, the
Johnson court noted that the lender's estate tax was unaffected by the
transfer.20 The Commissioner, however, claimed that such loans deprived the
lender's estate of the loan's use value. 21 Rejecting this contention, the court
found the lender was not obligated to charge interestI2 The foregone interest
23
represented only a potential value that was not part of the lender's estate.
Because the interest-free demand loans did not reduce lender's estate tax, the
Johnson court held the gift tax was inappropriately imposed.
In Crown v. Commissioner,24 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals likewise determined that an interest-free demand loan is not subject to gift tax on
the loan's use value.25 The Internal Revenue Code provides that a gift occurs
when a transfer is made for less than adequate and full consideration.2 6 The
Commissioner considered the demand loan transaction an "unequal exchange." Noting the time-value of money, the Commissioner argued that
lender's present transfer of money exceeded borrower's return promise of
14. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966). The loans in Johnson were made over an eightyear period to the lenders' son, daughter and son-in-law. By the end of the eighth year, all of
the loans had been repaid except one for $30,000 owed by the son-in-law. Id. at 75-76.
15. Id. at 77.
16. Id. See S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 496, 504
("as protection to ... estate ... taxes, a gift tax is imposed") [hereinafter cited as S. REP].
17. An inter vivos transfer is one made between living individuals which takes effect while

the transferor is alive.

BLACK'S LAW DICfIONARY

737 (rev. 5th ed 1979).

18. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 307 (1945) (gift tax aims to reach
only transfers which are withdrawn from donor's estate).
19. See 254 F. Supp. at 77. By use of the delivery process or inter vivos trusts it is possible
for a donor to make inter vivos transfers of the entire estate and still retain the use of the
property until death. But see Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) (settlor will be taxed
on irrevocable trust over which he retains control); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930)
(settlor will be taxed on corpus of revocable trust).
20. 254 F. Supp. at 77.
21. See id. at 73.
22. Id. at 77.
23. See id.
24. 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
25. Petitioners, three brothers who comprised a partnership, had made a series of
interest-free demand loans to trust funds for their children's benefit. Loans of approximately
$18 million were made into 24 separate trust funds, which enabled the trusts to purchase an
interest in an investment partnership. Id. at 235.
26. I.R.C. § 2512(b) (West Supp. 1982) provides:
Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth, then the amount by which the value of the property exceeded the
value of the consideration shall be deemed a gift, and shall be included in computing
the amount of gifts made during the calendar year.
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future repayment.27 Reiterating the Johnson rationaless the court explained
that potential interest was not part of the loan's value because the lender has
no duty to use his money productively, or to charge interest when he lends it.20
Moreover the promise to repay was full consideration for the demand loans,
since the lender could regain the funds at any time.30 By contrast, a promise to
repay an interest-free loan only after a definite term is an unequal exchange
which could result in a taxable gift.3 1
The Crown court also rejected the Commissioner's argument that the loan
was a gift of the lender's "property right" to use the money.3 2 To constitute a
gift under the gift tax statutes,3 3 a property right must have an exchangeable
value. 34 The court found no authority suggesting that borrower's right to use
the money had an exchangeable value; 35 therefore, transfer of this interest was
not a taxable gift.36
The instant court rejected the majority reasoning in Johnson and Crown,"
and found that an interest-free demand loan is subject to the gift tax 3s because it is both an unequal exchange and an outright gift of a property right.
Interpreting the statute in view of its legislative history,3 9 the court indicated
that the gift tax should be broadly applied.40 The court thus concluded that
the right to use funds constitutes "property" for gift tax purposes. 41 This finding
27. 585 F.2d at 238. "[G]iven the time value of money [the promise to repay] must be
worth less than its face." Id. In ascertaining the amount of the gift, the Commissioner would
multiply the outstanding balances by the market interest rate on similar notes. Id. at 238-89.
28. See 254 F. Supp. at 77 (quoted in Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060, 1064 (1977)).
29. See 585 F.2d at 235 (the ability to employ a productive asset in productive activity
creates an economic benefit).
80. See id. at 236 n.4. The court stated: "If payment is demanded immediately after the
loan is made, the present value will approximate the face value. If the loan remains perpetually unpaid, the present value approaches zero." Id. at 238 n.18.
31. Id. at 237 n.7. The court recognized that the present discounted value of an interestfree term loan is generally less than its face amount and the difference could be taxed as a
gift. Because Crown involved only demand loans, the question of gift tax on interest-free
term loans was left open. Id.
32. See id. at 239 (Commissioner analogized the right to use money to a "tenancy at

will,).
83. See I.R.C. §§ 2501-24 (West Supp. 1982).
84. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 27 (1982), reprinted in 1989-1 C.B. 457, 476
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REv.]; S. REP. supra note 16, at 89.
85. 585 F.2d at 239. The court noted that at common law a "tenancy-at-will" did not have
exchangeable value because an attempt to transfer it would terminate the right. Id. at 239
n.15.
36. Id. at 289. See H.R. RE., supra note 84, at 27 (the term "property" only reaches
rights with exchangeable value).
87. See 690 F.2d at 816-20.
38. The court began its analysis by setting out the scope of the gift tax provisions. Id.
at 814-15. See I.R.C. § 2511(a) (West Supp. 1982): "Subject to the limitations contained in this
chapter, the tax imposed by section 2501 shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal,
tangible or intangible...
89. See supra note 84.
40. 690 F.2d at 815, citing Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.. 808 (1945) (Congress desired
to "'hit all the protean arrangements which the wit of man can devise'...").
41. 690 F.2d at 815.
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was necessary because, by definition, a gift can occur only when property is
42
transferred.
In finding the interest-free transfer of property was an unequal exchange,
the court focused on the borrower's benefit from the loan rather than the
lender's lack of obligation to charge interest. The majority accepted Johnson's
declaration that the lender has no obligation to charge interest, but did not
find it legally significant. 43 The borrower benefited from the ability to earn
money with the funds without giving adequate consideration, such as interest,
in return. Thus, a taxable gift of the loan's use value occurred. 44
The instant court also concluded the interest-free loan was taxable as a
gift of a property right with an exchangeable value. 45 Refuting Crown's conclusion that the property right has no exchangeable value, the court noted
that the initial borrower could reloan the funds to another and charge
interest. 47 This potential consideration represents the exchangeable value of
the original lender's gift of his property right to use the money. 48
The instant court further explained that taxing interest-free loans effectuates the gift tax's purpose of preventing estate tax evasion. 49 The borrower's
benefit from the loan is not included in lender's estate and, therefore, not
subject to estate tax. Lender's estate, however, would have benefited if interest
had been charged or if the funds had been retained and invested. Failure to
obtain these benefits, in effect, reduces lender's estate and thus permits estate
tax evasion. 50
The instant court's decision that interest-free demand loans constitute a
taxable gift evidences a major shift in focus from Johnson and Crown. Those
courts considered the loan's possible gift aspects from the lender's viewpoint,
which is consistent with the Supreme Court's definition of gifts in Duberstein 51 The instant court instead examined whether the borrower benefited
from the loan. While the borrower clearly benefits from his ability to use
loaned funds without paying interest, this does not mean that a taxable gift oc52
curred.
42. I.R.C. § 2501 (West Supp. 1982) (imposes gift tax on the transfer of property).
43. 690 F.2d at 817.
44. See id. (if the transfer is made, it constitutes a taxable gift).
45. Id. at 818-19.
46. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
47. 690 F.2d at 818. The court conceded that the amount of interest chargeable would
depend upon how long the loan would remain outstanding. According to the court, however,
the inability to determine the exact value of the property right did not alter the conclusion
that a gift of that right occurred. This assumption fails, however, if the property right's
value is determined to be zero. If people are viewed as risk-adverse, the value of the use of
money for an unknown time will likely be nominal.
48. Id. at 819.
49. Id. at 817.
50. Id. See generally O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-FreeLoans, 27 VAND. L. REv. 1085
(1974).
51. See 363 U.S. at 285-86 (transferor's intention is a critical consideration). But cf. Treas.
Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (1981) (transferor's donative intent is not an essential element because
application of tax is based on objective factors); Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408 (donative
intent is not essential).
52. If the benefit the borrower receives is caused by the nature of the market economy,
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Inherent in taxing interest-free demand loans is the assumption that the
gift's value is the chargeable but uncollected interest. 3 The instant court thus
treats the lender's foregoing of interest as a discharge of the borrower's debt to
pay interest.5 4 Such a view presumes that the borrower would have had to pay
interest for the funds in an arm's length transaction; 55 and consequently, from
the borrower's standpoint, the cost of the loan was a gift from the lender. 6
From the lender's standpoint, however, the transaction does not resemble the
discharge of debt, but is merely the exercise of an option regarding the use of
his money.57 As noted in Johnson and Crown, the lender has no obligation to
charge interest on a loan. 58 In making the loan, the lender has an opportunity
to charge interest but, just as if the loan had never been made, the lender
also has the option not to realize the money's earning capacity.59 Imposing the
gift tax is, in effect, taxing the lender for failing to use his money most productively.

The instant court's focus on the borrower's benefit also fails to consider
the loan's demand nature in valuing the promise to repay. If the loan's value
exceeds that of the promise to repay, then a gift equal to the difference has
occurred.60 To the lender of a demand loan, the value of the promise to repay
equals that of the loan because the funds may be regained immediately by
demanding repayment. The lender's unrestricted access to the funds remains
constant whether the loan has been outstanding for one day or several years. 61
From the borrower's standpoint, however, as long as the money need not be
repaid immediately, the loan is worth more than the promise to repay.62 The
longer the loan remains uncollected the larger the difference in value bethen it becomes unclear whether the value was directly transferred to the borrower from
the lender or whether the value arises out of the transfer's nature. See, e.g., 585 F.2d at 236
(actively placing another in a position to benefit from capital allows taxpayer to vicariously
realize the benefit).
53. See 690 F.2d at 814 n.4 (interest rates used were the same as those established under
I.R.C. § 6621 (West Supp. 1982) market rate); 585 F.2d at 235 (deficiencies calculated by applying approximately the market rate); 254 F. Supp. at 73 (IRS assessed gift tax deficiencies by
approximating market rate of interest). But see 585 F.2d at 238 (the value is unknown and
unknowable).
54. See 585 F2d at 240 (finding a taxable gift is equivalent to finding that lender forgave the interest debt). See generally C. LowNDEs, R. KxuAxa, &J. McCoiw, FEDmAL EsTATE
AND GrFr TAXES § 26.12 (3d ed. 1974) (discussion of debt forgiveness as gift).
55. See Estate of Berkman v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 183, 186 (1979) (arm's
length transactions are profit motivated). This case dealt with the gift tax consequences of
interest-free loans made for a twenty-year term. Id. at 184. The court held a gift had occurred
at the time of the transfer. Id. at 186-87.
56. See supra note 52.
57. See 585 F.2d at 236-37 (the exercise of an option to forego interest does not reduce
the actual estate, but reduces only the potential estate).
58. See 254 F. Supp. at 77 (the right must arise through contract or statute).
59. See supra note 28. By avoiding placement in a higher tax bracket, a taxpayer might
well profit by minimizing the earning from his capital.
60. See supra note 26.
61. Of course, repayment of the loan might be restricted by the borrower's lack of credit
worthiness. 585 F.2d at 236 n.5.
62. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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comes.6 3 By contrast, when the loan is for a definite term, the difference in
value is the same from both the lender's and the borrower's viewpoint. This is
because the time it will take until the promise to repay is enforceable is equal
to the time that the borrower may use the funds.64 The lender cannot regain
the funds until the term ends.
Whether a property right with an exchangeable value is transferred by
the interest-free loan also depends on the focus used. The borrower's capability
to transfer the loaned funds to another for value supports the instant court's
conclusion that the property right to use the money has an exchangeable
value.65 Any such transfer by the borrower, however, must also be on a demand
basis in case the original lender asks for repayment.6 6 Because it depends on
the loan's unspecified duration, the value of the property right is indeterminable at the time of the loan.67 From the lender's viewpoint, the borrower's

right to use the funds has no value because the loan is immediately revocable.68
The difficulty in applying the gift tax to an interest-free demand loan is that
the lender and the borrower place different values on the right to use the
funds and the consideration for the loan. The proper valuation method is one
which focuses on the transaction from the lender's viewpoint, because it is the
lender who must pay the gift tax. This conclusion is supported by Duberstein,69
and by the Johnson and Crown holdings that no gift results from an interestfree demand loan.70 Although the borrower benefits from the loan, no strong
policy reason justifies forcing the lender to pay a gift tax on this benefit. The
instant court failed to recognize that gift tax statutes aim not to deter gifts but
to prevent estate tax evasion.71 Since interest-free demand loans do not reduce
63. See supra note 80. The closer the loan's maturity date becomes, the greater the
promise to repay's value. At maturity the value of the loan and the promise to repay are of
equal value. 585 F.2d at 238.
64. Although inapplicable for demand loans, a present discounted value formula may be
used to ascertain the difference in value at the time of the transfer for fixed term loans. If a
loan is made payable one year from the time of the transfer, the lender has no right to
collect the funds until that year has expired. The borrower has control of the funds for the
year but at the end of that year will be expected to pay back the loan.
65. See supra note 32. The cases cited by the instant court involved real property, in
which the right to use the property's value was claimed as a charitable deduction by the
lender. In all of these cases, the Commissioner had argued that the transfer of the right to
use property over time did not amount to a deductible gift. In the instant case, the Commissioner adopted the position he had argued against in the charitable deduction cases.
See, e.g., Passailaigue v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 682 (M.D. Ga. 1963) (involving charitable
contribution deductions); Allen v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 12 (1971) (term leasehold is a gift
for charitable deduction purposes).
66. Because the borrower has no way of knowing when the funds will have to be repaid,
those funds must be available.
67. 690 F.2d at 818.
68. See 585 F.2d at 239. The borrower does not have a legally protected right vis-a-vis
the lender, therefore, the lender would not view the borrower's ability to use the funds as
having value.
69. See supra note 51.
70. 585 F.2d at 235 (ruling in favor of taxpayer's argument that no taxable gift occurred); 254 F. Supp. at 77 (no gift within the meaning of the gift tax statutes).
71. See supra note 16.
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555

the lender's estate tax, the instant decision unnecessarily expands the reach of
the gift tax statute, creating numerous valuation and administrative difficulties
72
without yielding additional revenue.
DAVID VET=
72. See 585 F.2d 24041 (administrative difficulties render it more likely that taxpayers
will not or will be unable to comply with the tax's reporting provision).
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